Since Benjamin Netanyahu returned as prime minister in 2009, Israel has used covert operations, cyberattacks, diplomatic pressure and, ultimately, two wars in an effort to end Iran’s nuclear threat. The writer, who previously served as deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council for technology and special affairs, assesses that the central danger remains Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
On 31 March 2009, when Netanyahu was sworn in, Iran operated about 4,000 basic centrifuges at a single enrichment facility. By August 2009 it had uranium enriched to about 5%, enough, if taken to weapons-grade levels of around 90%, for slightly more than half a nuclear bomb. Israel prepared for a possible strike and repeatedly said that “all options are on the table.” Reports published in later years said opposition from senior Israeli defence officials led to a decision not to carry out the threatened attack.
From 2009 to 2013, foreign reports that were not denied said Israel assassinated several Iranian nuclear scientists and, with the United States, conducted a cyberattack on Natanz that destroyed about 1,000 of 8,700 centrifuges. Iran still expanded. In 2012 it began enriching at Fordow, built deep inside a mountain. Between August 2009 and August 2013 its enriched-uranium stockpile rose ninefold. It then held 5% material that could, after further enrichment, supply more than five bombs, plus 20% uranium equivalent to about one more bomb, and its enrichment capacity had tripled.
After diplomatic and economic pressure, Iran reached an interim deal and then a comprehensive agreement with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France — together with Germany. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in 2015, limited Iran’s programme for up to 15 years. Iran agreed to remove almost all enriched uranium, keeping only slightly more than one-tenth of the amount needed for one bomb and enriching to no more than 3.67%. It also committed to cut enrichment capacity by about 80%, end enrichment at Fordow and modify the Arak reactor so it would not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency monitored facilities, enrichment and centrifuge production, including continuous camera surveillance.
Despite IAEA reports that Iran was complying, Netanyahu urged the United States to leave the deal, arguing its terms were insufficient. In May 2018 President Donald Trump announced the US withdrawal and reimposed sanctions. Tehran began suspending its commitments in stages, while Russia and China strengthened economic ties with Iran and helped it circumvent American sanctions.
Foreign reports that were not denied said Israel later assassinated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who headed a group of scientists preserving and advancing nuclear expertise, and struck nuclear production and enrichment sites. Iran’s parliament required enrichment to resume at 20% and sharply restricted IAEA oversight. From April 2021 Iran enriched to 60%, described as about 99% of the enrichment work from natural uranium to weapons-grade material. By June 2025, estimates cited in the article said 60% uranium could, if further enriched, supply about 11 nuclear weapons. Iran had about 21,000 centrifuges and an estimated enrichment capacity 20 times greater than in 2018, while limits on inspections weakened the most comprehensive source of information on the programme.
From June 2025 to October 2026, Israel and the United States fought two campaigns intended to eliminate the nuclear threat and bring down the Islamic Republic’s leadership. Much of the political and military command was killed and nuclear infrastructure was heavily damaged, but the regime survived and appointed replacements the writer regards as more extreme, motivated by military humiliation and a wish to avenge the dead. Iran rejected Trump’s demands for surrender and for dismantling the programme by agreement. It focused on repairing damage and raising economic costs for Western countries by disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. As far as is known, the enriched uranium was not destroyed.
The writer identifies four mistakes. In 2009 Iran had one operating enrichment site, relatively few outdated centrifuges, limited enriched uranium and relatively limited weapons able to reach Israel; the writer judges a strike then could have halted or delayed enrichment for years and perhaps produced a JCPOA-like deal without an expiry date. By 2013 Iran had material that could ultimately supply more than six bombs and triple the enrichment capacity. Second, the 2015 deal cut the enriched stockpile by a factor of about 50 and enrichment capacity by a factor of five, pushing estimated breakout time to about one year, long enough for detection and, if needed, a damaging strike. Israel worked to undermine the agreement without preparing adequately for a military response if it collapsed. Iran then accelerated, Israel did not launch a comprehensive strike, and Russia and China helped Tehran evade US sanctions. Third, limited covert strikes and the killing of a scientist were followed by further expansion rather than an end to accumulation of enriched material. Fourth, by the 2025 campaign Iran already held highly enriched uranium potentially sufficient for about 11 weapons, so much enrichment infrastructure was less critical to reaching weapons-grade material. Israel focused on leaders and commanders and on infrastructure the writer says was largely no longer essential and comparatively easy to restore, while the uranium was not the main target and, as far as is known, remained intact.
The writer argues that until the end of 2022 a decisive operation against Iran’s ability to produce fissile material, comparable in determination to Israel’s strikes on reactors in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 under Menachem Begin and Ehud Olmert, could have devastated the weapons programme. From 2023 the priority should have been destroying or neutralising the enriched uranium. Neither course was taken when it was needed. The writer recalls Winston Churchill’s warning to the House of Commons on 2 May 1935 that Britain had neglected German rearmament while it was still manageable. In the writer’s assessment, Iran could now produce enough weapons-grade material for four bombs within four weeks using 5% of the enrichment capacity at facilities that were attacked but not fully destroyed. A site of about 1,000 square metres could suffice and would be relatively easy to copy and hide, and Iran has additional centrifuges stored elsewhere. Ynet has reported that Israeli intelligence believes Iran moved thousands of centrifuges to an underground nuclear-related site described as “Pickaxe Mountain.” The writer says Israel needs a different strategy and a reassessment of how to confront Iran’s nuclear ambitions.